Stalin’s Five Year Plans: Conversation with Szpakowski

Professor Michal Spakowski (Jastrӗbie Droj, Poland) was speaking to Rev Dr Kenneth Baker (Roscommon, Republic of Ireland)

MS “Stalin knew that the Five Year Plans were annihilating the rural infrastructure of the country. Why did he persist?”

KB Interesting question. But that presupposes that a prime objective was to build the rural economy, whereas…

MS Or re-build. Or re-invent.

KB Yes, yes. Accepted. But given the impoverished state of rural Russia after 1917 something radical had to be attempted. The new government had to start from scratch, with almost insuperable problems.

MS It’s interesting to note that we are the first generation of historians who are able to make a critical judgment on these events. The secret Communist archives are only now available. Previous writers made judgments based on little or no evidence.

KB And astonishingly, previous historians -Władysław Konopczyński?- often gave Stalin the benefit of the doubt: that at least part of the failure of the Five Year Plans was down to the rural populace. To their ignorance and obduracy.

MS I believe the archives indicate that Stalin took a personal control and hence bore personal responsibility. And so the question holds: why did Stalin persist when they are seen to fail?

KB I think we can also conclude that “Collectivization” and “Dekulakisation” were not strategies to create a new society at all. At least, not in Stalin’s eyes. They were all about control. Control by any means necessary. Control even if it meant wiping out whole villages and towns by induced famine.

MS Was he destroying his own past? Was Stalin wiping out provincial Russia? Ashamed of his Georgian background? Etc. Like part of “The grey man” myth? “Death is the ultimate silence.”

KB Perhaps that’s a step too far! But it’s true that he went to extraordinary lengths to cover up his own rural beginnings. No, the Five Year Plans had a single objective: get the maximum agricultural produce at the minimum price. An artificially deflated price. He read the rural situation as an opportunity to establish absolute control over the countryside in order to ensure the steady flow of agricultural “surplus,” needed for his larger project to industrialize the country. “Fifty years behind”, remember?

MS Part of this ignorant persistence is the application of a single policy to multiple situations. It’s like in your country, applying a policy to Wales, Scotland and Ireland without considering local conditions. In Russia it was much worse. There were whole cultural, linguistic, religious differences that were simply swept aside…

KB I think that situation did change, maybe by the early thirties. There were some situations where Stalin did begin to listen to the voices of local soviets.

MS Even then, only marginal concessions.

KB Perhaps so. But Stalin’s simplicity was part of his genius. And yet he only had one come-back: the increase of repression against both the population and the party apparatus that was supposed to carry out his orders.

MS Genius? The implacable repression of a whole class? Over 6.8 million deaths in the Ukraine alone? Stalin maintained a simple, brutalized policy that prioritized procurement aims, and used fatal pressure as a means to enforce it. And, as I said, the fact that the specific structure of each local society, culture and economy was largely ignored exacerbated the scope of the results.

KB Miscalculations?

MS On a huge scale. The archives reveal that even with local information available, and the disastrous local consequences evident, Stalin’s order of priorities was not shaken. He stuck to the policy of forcedly extracting agricultural production even after it had become obvious that this was thwarting any effort to create stable, functioning collective production structures in the countryside, and that it was even destroying those at places where they previously had been set up. Even less did he seem to care about the mass starving that went on in many regions. Stalin made no effort to find an intelligent way of developing a new model of rural society, based on Soviet ideology, not to talk about the even more sophisticated task of turning a traditional, semi-nomad population in rural areas into socialist farm workers. Instead, -as you suggested- he was waging a war to achieve full control over the agricultural sector, with the ultimate aim to achieve the extraction of the resources he needed, and he was fully aware of it. If he had miscalculated something, then this was the costs and the benefits of this strategy. Economically, the collectivization campaign was a total failure.

KB And morally?

MS Morally, it bears no words. Only the memory of grief.

Advertisements
This entry was posted in 1917, A Level History, Communism, Economic History, History, Russian revolution, Stalin, USSR and tagged , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

8 Responses to Stalin’s Five Year Plans: Conversation with Szpakowski

  1. I agree that Stalin may not have wanted to build a rural economy to any great extent, particularly not to create rural wealth. He utterly loathed the Kulak class. Above all, I think Stalin only wanted to use the peasants to provide labour for his FYPs and to feed the urban workforce.

    Also, I’m not sure it is too far to say that Stalin wanted to wipe out his Georgian background. He probably did, given how his background went against Stalinist ideology.

    I disagree that the collectivisation campaign was a “total failure” economically. From Stalin’s perspective, it was successful enough- grain procurements by the government increased, despite the national famine. Stalin wanted to feed the urban workforce, surely with procurements increasing, he went some way towards achieving this aim.

    • kenbaker says:

      Hi HHH,
      You make your points succinctly and with force. Szpakowski’s argument (I think) was to ask WHY Stalin loathed the Kulaks, but, sure, it is a psychological rather than a hitorically verifiable point and (as I said) a step too far. AS to your last point, as we’ve said before, it’s a question of cost, isn’t it? At what cost did he achieve his aim? And does short-term “success” counter-balance long-term depredation?
      If he had an email I’d let you slug it out with the old guy.

  2. We’ll never know why he loathed the Kulaks though, will we? Nobody can get into the mindset of someone quite so psychologically disturbed to determine exactly why he persecuted an entire race.
    If we are attempting at all to step into Stalin’s shoes (not an easy one!), he wouldn’t have cared about the long-term consequences, only his own short-term gain.

    Interesting interview

  3. kenbaker says:

    True on both counts in a general sense, though we do now possess his personal directives to the local soviets in answer to their pleas for clemency. These have never been available before and Szpakowski treats them quite fairly, in my opinion, and they do tell us more about Stalin’s intentionality.
    Can I ask: what module are you studying?

  4. I’m afraid I’d rather not give out any details, as I have explained to other people, I’d like my blog to be anonymous. This allows me to freely post on my blog alongside my professional work. I hope you’ll understand.

    highheeledhistorian

  5. ken baker says:

    Very wise. Wish I’d thought of that!

  6. Thanks for understanding

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s